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Abstract
The Palestinian refugee crisis is considered one of the oldest, largest, and most
complicated refugee issues in the world. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians have been
displaced as a result of the 1948 and 1967 wars between Israel and the Arab states.
Before fleeing their homes, Palestinians were persecuted and intimidated by the Israeli
army in 1947 and 1948, causing people to flee to different neighboring geographical
areas such as the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. The UNRWA, a
UN-associated entity, was established and began operations on May 1, 1950 to support
relief efforts benefiting the estimated 750,000 Palestinian refugees that were recognized
by the international community in the Middle East. According to the UNRWA, that
number has increased today to reach approximately 5 million Palestinian refugees. The
vast majority of these refugees are not allowed to return to their pre-1948 hometowns.
There was no resettlement or real rehabilitation in the places where they had sought
refuge, except for limited resettlement efforts in Jordan. Therefore, the right of return to
Palestinian refugees is one of the most important issues to be resolved in permanent
peace negotiations between Israel and Palestine. For 70 years, the Palestinian and Israeli
sides have been trying to reach a solution to the predicament of Palestinian refugees who
were displaced in 1948, and again after the 6 Days War in 1967, with no tangible success.
Although the international community has affirmed the right of return for Palestinian
refugees in multiple resolutions, continuous denial for any responsibility is the stance of
past and current Israeli governments. While Palestinians demand the application of the
right of return, the State of Israel denies any acceptance of responsibility due to several
ideological, philosophical and security concerns. Thus, the issue of Palestine refugees
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remains unsolved to date, with no clear path for future solutions. This work is aimed to
present the facts and earlier literature, followed by an analysis of the underlying reasons
for Israel’s denial of the right of return, and ending with practical and feasible solutions
for applying the right of return for the Palestinian refugees.
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1. Background
1.1. History of Palestine
Part of the Levant region and located on the Mediterranean Sea, historic Palestine
has long been known for its strategic and geographic location. Millions around the world
from Islamic, Christian and Jewish faiths consider the territory between the Jordan River
and the Mediterranean Sea to be the Holy Land. Additionally, the central and strategic
geographic location of this territory connecting Asia, Africa and Europe resulted in
increased interest in controlling that region of the world. Throughout history, the Levant
region, has suffered many colonial invasions and wars, ranging from the Canaanites and
Ancient Egyptians, through the Romans and crusaders, and finally when the Ottomans
invaded Palestine in the year 1519 (Ishida, 1999, p. 14-15). The period of Ottoman rule
lasted for 401 years and is considered one of the most important periods of modern
Palestinian history (Afyoncu, 2018, para. 3)
Palestine under Ottoman rule witnessed unprecedented prosperity, such as the
rebuilding of the Jerusalem Wall by Suleiman the Magnificent in 1537 (Israel Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, n.d.). However, it was not until the reign of Sultan Selim, and his son
Sultan Sulaiman al-Qenawi, that the empire was at the peak of its strength and prosperity.
For instance, the number of schools in Jerusalem alone was estimated to have reached 69
during Ottoman rule. Castles and forts that were destroyed during the invasion and the
Crusades of Palestine were renovated and expanded. Although most of the population
was Muslim, who were about 145,000, there were also about 5,000 Christians and an
equivalent number of Jewish individuals living in harmony and peace in or around
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Jerusalem in the 1530s (Pergola, 2001, p. 5). According to the Israeli Foreign Ministry
and the Jewish Virtual Library records,
“At the outset of the Ottoman era, an estimated 1,000 Jewish families lived in the
country, mainly in Jerusalem, Nablus (Shechem), Hebron, Gaza, Safed (Tzfat)
and the villages of Galilee. The community was comprised of descendants of
Jews who had never left the Land as well as immigrants from North Africa and
Europe.” (The Jewish Virtual Library, Pre-State Israel: Under Ottoman Rule
(1517-1917), para. 1)
After the death of Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent in 1566, 50 years after his
accession to the Ottoman Empire, the empire entered a period of decay and
administrative corruption, highlighted by repression of the rulers and army. Palestinians
struggled during the remaining 350 years of Ottoman reign in conditions that turned the
region from bad to worse. At the end of the eighteenth century, Napoleon Bonaparte's
attempt to establish his empire in the Near East, starting with invading Egypt and then
Palestine, led him to promise to establish a homeland for the Jewish diaspora in Palestine,
allegedly in return for funding from the Rothschilds for his campaigns. (The Jewish
Virtual Library, Pre-State Israel: Under Ottoman Rule, n.d.)
However, the influx of Jews into Palestine began during the Ottoman rule. The
first Jewish settlement in Palestine was a piece of land granted by Sultan Abdul Majeed I
in 1855 to a Jewish Englishman who worked as a consul in Istanbul, namely Moses
Montefiore (Ameesh, 2010, para. 1). The original purpose behind granting the land by the
Sultan was to establish a hospital for the Jewish people of Jerusalem. However, another
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hospital had already been built to serve the Jewish community around the same time the
land was granted, and instead, the Jewish Quarter was built. Therefore, it is considered
that Montefiore, the English Jewish man and philanthropist, was the first to lead the
Jewish settlement campaign in Jerusalem, facilitated by support from the wealthy Jewish
minority in Europe and America (Shmuel, 2013; “The Montefiore Censuses”, n.d., para.
2).
The Ottoman Empire went through several phases of bad government practices
and leadership, consequently destroying the once mighty power. Relations between Arabs
and Turks also deteriorated, not only in Palestine, but also across the region. Hussein bin
Ali and other prominent Arab leaders staged a revolt against Ottoman rule throughout the
Middle East. Furthermore, Hussein and the Arab leadership struck an alliance with
Britain to grant them self-governing rights in the Levant upon liberation from Ottoman
rule. Britain agreed to this, but secretly betrayed the Arabs and agreed with France and
Russia to divide the Levant in what became known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement. The
Great Arab Revolt against Ottoman Empire was declared in 1916. At the end of World
War I, Ottoman rule ended, which marked the end of the entire Islamic Caliphate. The
Middle East was divided and governed by Britain or France as dictated by the SykesPicot Agreement terms. However, it was not until the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres that
Palestine was assigned under the British mandate in 1920 and the territory became knows
as Mandatory Palestine (Morris, 2004).
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1.2. Mandatory Palestine
Palestinians say that their modern-day suffering began since Palestine was placed
under the British Mandate in 1920. Palestinians believe that Britain had supported the
Zionist movement and its trends and aspirations from early on as it was forming in
Europe, despite British promises for the Arab leaders to establish their own state in
Palestine. During the British occupation of Palestine, then Secretary of State Arthur
Balfour was heavily influenced by the Zionist ideology. He pledged to grant the Jewish
minorities a state of their own in Palestine in the form of the Balfour Declaration of 1917
(Balfour Declaration Letter, 1917). The Declaration of Balfour represents the beginning
of the Zionist-Palestinian conflict, long before the State of Israel was founded, and
remains to be a very controversial act until this day. As described by the PalestinianAmerican scholar Edward Said:

“The Balfour Declaration was made a) by a European power b) about a nonEuropean territory c) in a flat disregard of both the presence and wishes of the
native majority residents in that territory, and it took the form of a promise about
the same territory to another foreign group, so that this foreign group might, quite
literally, make the territory a national home for the Jewish people."
(Khatchadourian, 2000, p. 2)
However, despite the fact that Secretary Balfour did indeed promise the establishment of
a Jewish state in Palestine as evidenced in his letter to one of the Zionist movement
leaders, Balfour also emphasized that the rights of Palestinians should be protected.
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“I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of this Majesty’s
Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist
aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet. His
Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a
national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate
the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be
done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish
communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any
other country. I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the
knowledge of the Zionist Federation.” (Balfour, 1917)

Following the Balfour Declaration, the angry Palestinian community felt betrayed
and began to organize a revolution against the British forces, led by Amin al-Husseini.
Occasional clashes also took place between the Palestinians and Jewish immigrants, who
were increasing in numbers (estimated to have reached 175,000 in 1931, more than
doubling the 84,000 Jewish residents as of 1922). At the same time, the Palestinian
Muslim and Christian population was estimated to be 850,000 in 1931 (Pergola, 2001, p.
5). Furthermore, the idea of Jewish immigration was widely welcomed by Britain and
other nations, because of the anti-Semitic movement in Europe. Hitler's crimes, the
Holocaust, and the persecution of Jews in Europe helped to gain momentum and support
to the establishment of a national homeland for the Jews in Palestine (Morris, 2004).

6
All this resulted in increased anger on the Palestinian side, which led to the
eruption of the Arab revolution in 1936. Britain quickly attempted to absorb the
revolution by sending a commission of inquiry to Palestine, which later became known as
the Peel Commission, led by Lord Peel in 1936. The main task of the Commission was to
investigate and offer solutions to the complicated situation on the ground. In 1937, The
Peel Commission recommended partitioning Palestine into a Jewish state on 20% of the
land between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, and a Palestinian state where
Palestinians receive 70% of the land. The remaining 10% of the land was to remain under
British control indefinitely. While the Zionist movement accepted this solution, the
Palestinians rejected it. Consequently, the Palestinian revolution was renewed in 1937
(Morris, 2004).

1.3. The 1948 War and Palestinian Refugees Crisis
The Zionist movement continued to support the migration of the Jewish diaspora
over the next few years, causing the Jewish population in Palestine to increase to an
estimated 650,000 in 1947 (Pergola, 2001, p. 4). Additionally, the Zionist movement
announced publicly for the first time ever that its goal was to establish a Jewish state in
Palestine. This announcement was made in May of 1942, during the program of a Zionist
conference in Baltimore. This announcement confirmed the Zionist movement’s
intentions, and the Palestinians realized that their dream of an independent state on all of
historic Palestine was under serious threat.
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Before the declaration of the end of the British mandate on Palestine, specifically
on November 29th, 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed Resolution
181 to partition Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state. Jerusalem and Bethlehem
were placed under United Nations control due to the cities’ religious significance and in
an effort to preserve equal access to Holy sites. It is of significance to mention that in
1947, the Jewish population in Palestine were estimated to be approximately 32%, while
the Christian population represented 7%, and the remaining 61% of the population were
Palestinian-Arabs of Muslim faith. Despite the Jewish population being almost half of
that of the Arab counterpart, the proposed Jewish state was granted 56% of the area of
Palestine to accommodate the anticipated migration of Jewish people from across the
globe, while the proposed Arab state would be established on 43% of the disputed land.
While the Jews welcomed the decision, the Palestinian-Arabs declared their rejection, yet
again, escalating the conflict in the region (Morris, 2004; A/RES/181(II), 1947).

In 1948, British troops began to withdraw from the Palestinian territories and
evacuate their positions, which were quickly claimed by the well-equipped and organized
Zionist militias. This resulted in them having an upper hand in the consequent fighting
with the Palestinians over territories in Palestine, ending with the declaration of
establishment of the State of Israel in the Palestinian territories on May 15, 1948. The
history of the State of Israel began with the 1948 war, known as the Nakba (catastrophe, a
common term in Arabic used by Palestinians to refer to the series of events that followed
the 1948 war).
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Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians have been displaced as a result of the 1948
war. Before fleeing their homes, the Palestinians were persecuted, intimidated and
massacred by the Israeli army in 1947 and 1948, displacing people into different
neighboring geographical areas. In this war, the losses were great for the Palestinian and
Israeli sides. Official Palestinian statistics are estimated at 15,000 killed, while the
number of deaths in other Arab armies ranges between 3700 and 7000. As for the number
of Israelis that were killed, it is estimated at 6,000 or 1% of the Israeli population in 1948
(Aljazeera News Media, War of 1948, n.d.; Plen, n.d.).

As a result of the 1948 war, the majority of Palestinians living in Palestine were
displaced. Some refugees migrated to the nearby West Bank, which was under the control
of the Jordanian army. Other Palestinians from the southern parts of Palestine and the
surrounding villages migrated to the Gaza Strip, while the remaining Palestinians
migrated to geographically neighboring countries such as Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and
Egypt. Ever since, there have been several wars between the Arab states and Israel, and
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict remains an issue that still awaits a solution to this day.
While wars are clearly catastrophic and have very severe consequences, the resulting
losses are undoubtedly the most serious. The losses are not only in terms of the number
of dead or wounded, but also of refugees and displaced persons deprived of the right to
return to their homes (American Friends Service Committee, n.d.; Beinin, 2014).
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1.4. Establishment of the UNRWA
Following the 1948 war, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine (UNRWA) was established by resolution 302 (IV) of the United Nations
General Assembly on 8 December 1949, with the aim of providing direct relief and
employment assistance to Palestine refugees (A/RES/194 (III), 1948). Additionally, the
United Nations General Assembly affirmed the right of return for the Palestinian
refugees, or compensation for those who choose to not return as indicated in resolution
194,

“[Palestinian] Refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with
their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and
that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return
and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law
or equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible.”
(A/RES/194 (III), 1948)

The UNRWA began operations on May 1, 1950 and was intended to support
relief efforts benefiting the estimated 750,000 Palestinian refugees recognized by the
international community in Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.
According to UNRWA, approximately 5 million Palestinians today are eligible for aid
and fit the refugee definition as set by the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the 1951 Convention relating to the status of
refugees and its 1967 protocol:
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“A refugee is someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of
persecution, war, or violence. A refugee has a well-founded fear of persecution
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a
particular social group.” (UNGA, 1951; Members' Research Service, 2015)

1.5. The 1967 War
In November 1956, Israel participated in a tripartite aggression involving Britain
and France against Egypt following the decision of President Gamal Abdel Nasser to
nationalize the Suez Canal. Israel’s interest was to secure the Straits of Tiran passage for
its ships that had been closed due to tensions between Egypt and Israel since 1948.
Consequently, Israel occupied the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula, but withdrew from
it in March 1957 due to locals’ resistance, international pressure and UN resolutions.
Israel received assurance that the Straits of Tiran would remain open for passage of
Israeli ships. On 5 June 1967, Egypt declared that it would deny Israeli ships passage
through the Straits of Tiran and began mobilizing its army near the borders with Israel.
Israel viewed the move as a declaration of aggression, and war erupted between Israel
and three Arab states; Egypt, Jordan and Palestine in what became known as the Six Days
War (Johnson, 2017). As a result of this aggression, Israel seized all of the Palestinian
territories after it occupied Gaza Strip and the West Bank as well as the Egyptian Sinai
Peninsula and the Syrian Golan Heights. The 1967 Six Days War caused further
displacement of Palestinians in what they referred to in Arabic as Naksa (which translates
to ‘setback’ in Arabic). An estimated additional 250,000 to 350,000 Palestinians were
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displaced as a result of the 1967 war, some of whom had already been living in refugee
camps in Gaza Strip or the West Bank since 1948. As per UNRWA’s historic timeline,
approximately 10 new refugee camps were established to absorb the new wave of
refugees following the 1967 war (UNRWA Palestine Refugees, 2018; McDowall, 1989).
The Palestinian refugee crisis is considered one of the oldest, largest, and most
complicated refugee issues in the world. The number of Palestinians assessed by the
Palestinian Authority in 2010 is estimated at 10.9 million with 7.5 million refugees,
representing 70% of the Palestinian population. The vast majority of these refugees are
not allowed to return to their pre-1948 or pre-1967 hometowns. Resettlement and
integration were not completely realized. Therefore, the right of return, to Palestinian
refugees, is one of the most important issues to be resolved in permanent status
agreements and peace negotiations between Israel and Palestine. For 70 years, the
Palestinian and Israeli sides have been trying to reach a solution to the predicament of
Palestinian refugees who were displaced in 1948, and again after the 6 Days War in 1967,
with no tangible success.

1.6. What is the Right of Return?
The right of return for Palestinian refugees grants for every Palestinian refugee, and
their descendants, to return to their homes and lands, which they left for any reason
during the 1948 war. The right of return guarantees Palestinian refugees the right to
return to the lands of 1948 and 1967 or the right to compensation for the suffering of their
emigration from their homeland. The phrase "right of return" appeared after the 1948
war, after a series of massacres committed allegedly by the Israeli army against dozens of

12
Palestinian villages and cities, which resulted in the displacement of nearly 800,000
Palestinians. It is important to highlight that the right of return also applies to the
descendants of any Palestinian who left their homes and lands in 1948 (Zilbershats, 2011;
El-Sa’edi, 2018; Sayej, 2018). International Human Rights Law affirmed this right, and
the United Nations General Assembly passed resolution 194, considered the first
resolution on the Palestine refugee issue. Resolution 194,
“Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with
their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and
that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return
and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law
or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities
responsible… The Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment
of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United
Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate
organs and agencies of the United Nations.” (A/RES/194 (III), 1948)
Although some argue that the definition of right of return put forth by the United
Nations in 1948 is outdated and no longer viable (i.e. Palestinian refugees returning to the
State of Israel given that their homes and villages no longer exist), this definition for the
right of return remains to be the ultimate guide and reference for Palestinians. However,
years of no solution for Palestinian refugees issue could dictate the necessity to make
iterations to what the right of return practically means nowadays, 70 years after
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Palestinians migrated from their villages in 1948. For instance, financial compensation
and/or a symbolic "return" to a new Palestinian state constructed from the Occupied
Territories could potentially replace the classical right of return definition, contingent on
the agreement by both Palestinians and Israelis. However, the historic definition of the
right of return for Palestinian refugees to their pre-1948 villages will be used throughout
the thesis, given that is what was set forth and currently accepted by the international
community.

1.7. Which Palestinian Refugees are Included in the Right of Return?
UNRWA defines the Palestinian refugees as “The persons whose normal place of
residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost
both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict.” (UNRWA Palestine
Refugees, 2018)
Palestinians were displaced to various areas during the 1948 war. The number of
Palestinians who left their homeland in 1948 was estimated at nearly 800,000 who
emigrated to the West Bank, Gaza Strip, or to neighboring Arab countries such as
Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. Nowadays, the number of Palestinian refugees has increased
by roughly 10 fold since 1948, due to the fact that descendants of Palestinian refugees are
also included in the UNRWA definition of Palestine refugees. According to UNRWA
records, the agency began by responding to the needs of nearly 750,000 Palestinian
refugees. Today, almost 5 million Palestinian refugees are eligible for UNRWA's
services. The majority of current Palestinian refugees numbers are distributed as follows:
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•

Gaza Strip has approximately 1.3 million Palestinians who are UNRWAregistered refugees and are distributed across 8 different refugee camps.

•

West Bank has over 800,000 Palestinians who are registered with
UNRWA and are distributed across 19 different refugees camps.

•

Israel has approximately 335,204 Palestinian refugees who were
internally displaced into areas that fall within Israel’s borders.

•

Egypt has approximately 50,000 Palestinian refugees.

•

Jordan has the largest proportion of Palestinian refugees outside of
Palestine, estimated at nearly two million. They live a decent life
compared to other refugees elsewhere, since Jordan granted Palestinian
refugees full citizenship rights.

•

Lebanon has approximately 450,000 Palestinian refugees who are
registered with UNRWA, and around 3,000 Palestinians in Lebanon who
are not registered and have no other form of official identity or formal
documents. The refugees of Lebanon are considered to have the worst
living conditions relative to Palestine refugees in other territories. They
are often deprived of basic educational, health and professional rights.

•

Syria has around 526,000 Palestinian refugees who are registered with
UNRWA. The numbers reflect the population of Palestinian refugees in
Syria prior to the eruption of the ongoing civil war since 2011. It is
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estimated that many of those refugees have been forced to leave the
country along with many Syrians due to the brutality of the war.

•

Iraq has approximately 11,544 UNHCR-registered Palestinian refugees

(Palestine Refugees: Locations and Numbers, 2010)
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2. Literature Review
The issue of Palestinian refugees remains at the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict,
which continues to this day. Over the decades, there has been a great deal of negotiations
between the Israelis and the Palestinians to find a mutually acceptable solution to the
question of the return of refugees. Most of these negotiations have been in the form of
meetings and summits seeking to resolve the situation of Palestinian refugees.

The Declaration of Principles for Peace Negotiations that took place in Oslo, 1993, is
considered to be the most significant milestone of all peace negotiations thus far. The
Palestinian position during the negotiations has been firm on the commitment to the right
of the Palestinian refugees to return to their cities and the right to a fair compensation for
all their losses. The Palestinian negotiation team’s stance on the right of return for
refugees relies heavily on the United Nations Resolution 194 of 11 December 1948,
which provides for the establishment of a United Nations conciliation commission, the
determination of the status of Jerusalem in a permanent international order, and the
determination of the right of refugees to return to their homes in accordance with the
provisions of international law.

In spite of several attempts to achieve consensus among the conflicting parties on a
solution for the issue of Palestinian refugees, all commissions and interventions from the
international community has failed. This led to an agreement during the Oslo Accord
discussions that the topic of refugees, along with other topics of conflict such as
Jerusalem and borders, is postponed to permanent status negotiations intended to take
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place no later than the year 2000. By the time the deadline approached, a new wave of
violence erupted, and the peace process began to deteriorate until it reached a complete
stop since 2013.

In order to further dissect and understand some of the root causes for a lack of
solutions on the Palestinian refugees issue, one must take a step back and investigate the
two different perspectives, the Israeli and the Palestinian, in terms of the origins and the
narratives of how this refugee problem came to exist.

2.1. Narratives of the Palestinian Refugee Crisis
Expectedly, there are two completely different, and often contradictory, versions
of the origins of the Palestinian refugees’ problem, commonly viewed as a product of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On one hand, there are Israeli narratives that dominate the
ideas of Israeli society. On the other hand, different narratives dictate what Palestinians
believe. Using the words of Marwan Hanania on his review of Robert Rotberg’s book
titled ‘Israeli And Palestinian Narratives of Conflict: History's Double Helix’, “[Israelis
and Palestinians] view similar events from different angles” (Hanania, 2009; Rotberg,
2006, p. 2). Rotberg further illustrates that the Palestinian and Israeli sides recount the
events of 1948 in a way that serves the interests of each side. He interviewed Dan BarOn, an Israeli psychology professor, and Sami Adwan, a Palestinian education professor,
where they both agreed that “The Israeli and Palestinian narratives are intertwined like a
double helix, but they are still separate and should be acknowledged as such” (Rotberg,
2006, p. 205).
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2.1.1. Israeli Narratives
The Israeli narrative on the Palestinian refugee crisis is that the refugee issue is a
completely made up problem. The mainstream Israeli narrative is that in 1948 the Arab
states were the ones who asked the Palestinians to leave their homes, in order to allow the
Arab armies to advance and fight the Jewish minorities, without causing any casualties on
the Palestinian side. It further goes to describe that the Arab inhabitants of Palestine at
that time (1947-1948) were the ones who launched the attack on the Jews, whose
responses were of limited defensive nature to only fight back terrorist aggressors. The
Israeli narrative also claims that the Arabs had fled Palestine for fear of retaliation from
the Jewish population, since the Palestinian-Arabs were committing many crimes against
the Jewish minority, and that the Arabs knew it was only a matter of time before the
Jewish forces took revenge (Morris, 2004; Collins, 1972; Eyal, 2016; Katz, 1973;
Kurzman, 1992, Syrkin, 1971). Additionally, the Israeli narrative suggests that the
Palestinians who migrated,
“Were not emigrating but merely moving eastward within the boundaries of
Greater Palestine which stretched far to the eastern side of the Jordan River where they
would encounter the same climate, language, religion and ethnic community that they
had left behind” (Eyal, 2016).

Lastly, the Israeli narrative also questions the Palestinian refugee numbers in
discussion. Israeli historians often reference the report put together by Hagana’s
intelligence service, which describes the Palestinian refugee numbers as of June 1948 at
approximately 391,000. This number represents half of the number of Palestinian
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refugees estimated by the Arab states and acknowledged by the United Nations during
the same period after the 1948 war.

2.1.2. Palestinian Narratives
The Palestinian narrative claims that Arab inhabitants of the region were forced to
emigrate as a result of the panic caused by the ongoing fighting and the multiple attacks
on Palestinian civilians by Jewish militia forces such as Haganah, Irgun and Histadrut.
Palestinian historians also indicate that news and rumors that spread about horrific acts of
terrorism, murder and expulsion against Arabs further fueled this migration, causing
some Palestinian villagers to flee even before the Israeli forces arrived in fear for their
lives (Amirav, 2009; Anderson, 1983; Arieli, 2009; Morris, 2004; Eyal, 2016; Khalidi,
1998; Peretz, 1958)

The Palestinian narrative also suggests that Israel has worked in every way to
push as many Arab inhabitants as possible to flee their lands, homes and farms. The Deir
Yassin Massacre, where Palestinian women, children, men and the elderly were allegedly
indiscriminately killed, served the main purpose to instill fear and terror in the hearts of
the Palestinians in the region. There are no exact numbers for the death toll, but it is
estimated that around 200 Palestinians were killed from the village of Deir Yassin, about
half the residents, while the remaining were relocated further east (Kanaana, 1987, p. 55).
The Deir Yassin Massacre succeeded in forcing many reluctant-to-leave Palestinians to
flee their homes from the horrors that awaited them.
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Describing the Palestinian viewpoint on the events that led to their fear and consequent
migration, Eyal Lewin, the Chair of Department of Multidisciplinary Studies at Ariel
University in Israel, wrote:

“Most of the Palestinian refugees were forced out of the country as a result of
an Israeli ethnic cleansing program that aimed to create geographic continuity and
a Jewish majority throughout Palestine. The attacks on Arab villages all over the
country entailed the destruction of the Palestinian community and the expulsion
of the bulk of the Palestinian Arabs.” (Eyal, 2016, p. 20)

Eyal further describes that the ethnic cleansing against Palestinians that was carried out
by the Israeli forces came under the umbrella of a military executive order known as Plan
Dalet, or Plan D, which was implemented during the 1948 war. Eyal describes:

“Some of the clauses of Plan D are apparent within orders given to the forces by
the Israeli leadership of the time, mainly Ben Gurion and Moshe Dayan: The […]
Destruction of villages (setting fire, blowing up, and planting mines in the debris),
especially in those population centers which are difficult to control continuously.
[…] the encirclement of the village and conducting a search inside it. In the event
of resistance the armed force must be wiped out and the population must be
expelled outside the borders of the state.” (Eyal, 2016, p. 21; Gilad, 1957, p. 286)
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The Palestinian narrative also claims that the Zionist movement had pre-determined
plans before the 1948 war to expel the Palestinians and displace them to the territories of
the future Arab state in Palestine that is yet to be formed, or to other neighboring Arab
countries. These plans, which eventually came true under the pretext of ending the
escalating conflict between the Arab and Jewish parties, ensured the establishment of a
Jewish-dominant state with an Arab minority. However, an Arab state in Palestine was
never established in the territory, but rather further occupied in 1967 (Morris, 2004).
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3. Denial of the Right of Return
The Israeli government’s position on Palestinian refugees has not changed since
1948; the Israeli government does not recognize the right of Palestinian refugees to
return. Israeli officials continue to say that Palestinian refugees, and their descendants,
cannot be allowed to return to the homes and communities from which they have been
displaced. The Israeli historic rationale has been fixated on the fact that return would
pose a threat to maintaining a Jewish demographic majority in Israel. Joseph Weitz, the
head of the Jewish Agency’s Colonization Department in 1940 said,

“Between ourselves it must be clear that there is no room for both peoples
together in this country. We shall not achieve our goal if the Arabs are in this
small country. There is no other way than to transfer the Arabs from here to
neighboring countries – all of them. Not one village, not one tribe should be left.”
(Weitz, 1965, p.293)

This position is supported by an absolute majority of Israeli citizens from all over the
political spectrum, because the return of such large numbers of Palestinian refugees to the
State of Israel will have far-reaching consequences for the nature of the state. These
arguments however are based mostly on the fear of changing the identity of the Israeli
State.

For instance, when then prime minister Ehud Barak during the Camp David summit
of 2000 had expressed that Israel sympathizes with the struggle of the Palestinian
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refugees and what has happened to them following the 1948 war, and hinted that the State
of Israel may be open to limited repatriation of Palestinian refugees and/or contributing
funds to an international organization that could help with rehabilitation of Palestinian
refugees at their host countries, public surveys conducted in Israel the very following
month in August 2000 showed that over 75% of Israelis rejected the proposed return of
Palestinians into Israel. In fact, the same survey showed that the Israeli public would
rather give up sovereignty over Jerusalem than allow for Palestinian refugees to return
into Israel (Shuval, 2002; Tovy, 2003; Eyal, 2016).

However, a new poll on the return of Palestinian refugees, conducted by
Geocartography Knowledge Group, a leading research institute in Israel, reveals
differences in opinions regarding the right of return within the Israeli society based on
age, ethnicity and income. The survey involved 500 Israeli Jews from different
backgrounds. The study concluded that one out of every four Jewish Israelis supports the
right of return of Palestinian refugees (25%). Israelis aged 18 to 34 support the right of
return at a particularly high rate (25.9%) compared with adults over the age of 55
(15.1%) and between 35 and 54 (7.3%). Secular Jews supported the right of return four
times higher than Jewish religious Jews (22.3% versus 5.2%, respectively). Additionally,
Israelis demonstrated differences in opinions based on whether they are secondgeneration Israelis, Israelis whose parents were born in Europe, or Israelis whose parents
are of Mizrahi origin. Second-generation Israelis supported the right of return at a much
higher rate (22.6%) compared to those born to European immigrants (14.1%), and those
born to Mizrahi parents also referred to as Easterners, (11.7%). Also, the study concluded
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that Israelis with middle incomes are likely to support the right of return twice more than
those who earn above average income (21.9% versus 12.7%) (Middle East Monitor,
2018).

3.1. Argument #1: Israel is a Nation for Jews
One of the most important concerns of the Israeli people is to preserve the Jewish
national identity. During the last two decades of the 19th century, Theodore Herzl, the
Hungarian Jewish journalist, was considered the spiritual father and founder of World
Zionism as a colonial political movement that gave Jews the status of nationality. In
1896, Herzl published his book ‘The Jewish State’ explaining that the idea of this state is
not new, but "a very old one: it is the restoration of the Jewish State" (Herzl, 1896, p.1;
The Jewish Virtual Library, Texts Concerning Zionism: Excerpts from “The Jewish
State”, para. 2).

Herzl intended to give the Jewish state project a historical dimension in order to justify
the restoration of this state as a "historical right" for the Jews. Since the state is
synonymous with nationalism, the nationality of the Jews "cannot be destroyed and will
not be destroyed and must not be destroyed" (Herzl, 1896).

It has been also suggested that Herzl worked on linking three main points to the
establishment of the Jewish state; first, the social dimension through the alignment and
galvanization with Jews from the lower classes of the European social ladder. The second
being the religious dimension in an attempt to evoke the phrase "promised land" and "the
chosen people of God" and to show that the restoration of the revival of the Jewish state
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is a divine matter from God. Third, the national dimension in which the Jews, despite
their distribution in the diaspora, are one people and represent a unified nation.

"I think that the Jewish question is no longer just a social problem, it is a religious
issue, but it may take other forms" Herzl said in his book ‘The Jewish State’. He added
that "A national issue that can only be solved when it is treated as a global political issue
that must be discussed by the peoples of the world. Civilized in an international council."
(Herzl, 1896, p. 1, 6 and 9; EL-Soud, 2017; Mourad, 2011)

3.2. Argument #2: The Return of Palestinian Refugees Will Distort the Jewish
Identity of the State of Israel
After examining the original concept of Zionism and re-establishing the Jewish
state first envisioned by Herzl, it becomes clear that, from the Israeli government’s point
of view, the Palestinian demand for the right of return for refugees is a red line.
Additionally, the return of any significant number of Palestinian refugees to Israel could
obliterate the Jewish identity of the state, which is in direct opposition to the very
fundamental basis for rebuilding a Jewish state. In an article in the Maariv Newspaper,
writer Amos Gilboa, a strategic Israeli researcher and political analyst, said that the right
of return for the Palestinians clearly meant the end of the Zionist state. In the same
context, journalist Nawaf El-Zarrou listed several proposals by key Israeli figures since
the middle of the twentieth century attempting to eliminate the issue of the Palestinian
refugees’ right of return. Zarrou writes that the second Prime Minister in Israel’s history,
who later became Minister of Foreign Affairs, Moshe Sharett called for giving up the
Palestinians' right to return as a condition for re-entering into negotiations in 1956. Nine
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years later, Levi Eshkol, the third Prime Minister to lead an Israeli government proposed
on May 17 1965 that Palestinian refugees must surrender their right of return, and that the
State of Israel would in return contribute large sums of money towards the rehabilitation
of those refugees outside of Israel. Several other proposals were renewed or reiterated by
other prominent Israeli government leaders such as Moshe Dayan in his proposal of 1972,
David Ben-Gurion in 1972, and Shimon Peres in 1976 (El-Zarrou, 2008).

The demographic factor has been historically the most decisive factor in
determining the victory of one of the two parties, Israeli or Palestinian, to the conflict
over the land between the Jordan River in the East and the Mediterranean Sea on the
West. The demographic factor is also one of the most important forms of geopolitical
conflict between the Israeli and Palestinian sides. Israel fully recognizes the importance
of this factor in order to preserve the identity of the Jewish state, and therefore the right
of return is outright rejected. Israel is fully aware that the Palestinian fertility rate is high
for social, cultural and religious reasons compared to Jewish citizens in Israel. Israel
recognizes that fertility and population growth rates for the Palestinians will change state
demographics in favor of a Palestinian-dominant society. If Palestinian refugees are
allowed to return to their historic hometowns in Israel, in a matter of few decades
Palestinians will become the majority and will sweep the State of Israel and its plan to
maintain its Jewish identity. Table 1 illustrates that Palestinians, inside Israel or within
Palestinian Territories, have almost double the fertility rate and overall population growth
rate compared to Jewish counterparts in Israel.
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Table 1. Demographics of the Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab two major
populations in Israel and Palestine. Statistics shown are not reflective of Jewish
and Palestinian diaspora around the world (Palestinian Central Bureau of
Statistics; Mourad, 2011).

Population

Israelis
(Jewish)

Demographics in the region
between the Jordan River and the
Mediterranean Sea
Number
Year
%
(millions)
55.5
1997
4,701,600

Palestinians

2007

5,478,200

52.5

1997

3,765,700

44.5

2007

4,947,226

47.5

Growth
Rate

Fertility Rate
(Child per woman)

1.8 %

2.6

3.3 %

4.2

Therefore, it can be said that not only the Israeli government, but also Israelis
from all shades of the political spectrum, often are in favor of rejecting the
implementation of the right of return under UN Resolution 194, which calls for the return
of Palestinians to their homes; on the pretext that such a solution constitutes a threat to
the identity of the State of Israel and changes its character as a Jewish state due to the
demographic imbalance that will result from the application of the right of return of
Palestinian refugees.

3.2.1. Future-Proofing the State of Israel by Passing The Jewish National
Law
On July 19, 2018, the Israeli Knesset (parliament) passed a law that declares the
country as the ‘Nation-State for Jewish People Alone,’ also known as the Jewish National
Law. The law was proposed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government,
which has been described as the most right-wing and religious coalition in Israel’s history
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(Halbfinger, 2018). Although the split in the number of votes reflect a great divide within
Israel’s legislative body for varying reasons, the law was passed with 62 votes for, 55
votes against and two abstentions. This newly passed Jewish National Law stipulates that
1) the State of Israel is the national homeland of the Jewish people, 2) the Greater and
Unified Jerusalem is the capital of Israel forever, 3) the right of self-determination in the
State of Israel is limited to the Jews, and 4) the Hebrew language is the official language
of the State and the Arabic language has lost its status as an official language. Many
critics of the new law, including Jewish faith leaders, non-Jewish minorities in Israel, and
expectedly Palestinians, claim that this is basically an apartheid law that disregards any
other ethnic or religious group in the State of Israel. The law also declares that the Israeli
government will do all it can to encourage Jewish settlement everywhere in the land of
Israel, including the West Bank territory, which belongs to the Palestinian Authority as
outlined in the Oslo Accords.

The Palestinians say that there is no doubt that the Jewish National law is based
on discrimination between Jews and Arabs on an ethnic and religious basis. The law
affirms that only Jews have the right to decide the fate of the State of Israel, meaning that
the Israeli-Arabs who are citizens of Israel, and living within Israeli government
sovereignty, have no right to decide their fate. On the other hand, the Arab population,
representing approximately 21% of Israel’s population, in addition to other minorities are
excluded; which can cause discrimination to become justified and legitimate, according
to which Palestinians become strangers in their homeland. Many experts view the act as a
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codification and extension of racist colonial legacy, based on ethnic cleansing and the
abolition of the other (Bard 2018; Halbfinger, 2018).

The Jewish National law is also viewed as one of the most dangerous laws
recently enacted by Israel. The law came with a set of clauses that emphasized the racial
superiority of Jews as individuals and as people in all aspects. Where Israel identifies
itself as a Jewish and democratic state, some argue that this law has come to negate any
manifestation of democracy and resolves what is described as tension between the Jewish
character and the democratic character of the state. The new law has no mention of
democracy and equality, which is concerning as it could be viewed that the State of
Israel, by definition under the new law, becomes a non-democratic Jewish state. This
offers an explanation to the strong reactions and protests that have been recorded in Israel
after the enactment of the law, not only by the Palestinian minority in Israel, but also
from Israeli Jews who view the new law as harmful to the state of Israel, and from other
ethnic and religious minority groups such as Druze, Syriac Christians, Armenians,
Assyrians and others.

Passing of the Jewish National Law has led the European Union to publicly
announce their unease with this development. Federica Mogherini, the spokeswoman for
EU foreign affairs commented on the new law passed by Israel saying that,
“We are concerned, we have expressed this concern and we will continue to
engage with Israeli authorities in this context”. She further added “[EU has] been
very clear when it comes to the two-state solution, we believe it is the only way
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forward and any step that would further complicate or prevent this solution of
becoming a reality should be avoided.” (Haaretz, 2018)

The issue of Israel as a Jewish state has become increasingly important in recent
years and a major point of contention between Israelis and Palestinians. For years now,
Israeli governments have relentlessly demanded that the Palestinian Authority recognize
Israel as a Jewish state, but the Palestinians continue refusing to do so. Thus, Israel
enacted the National Jewish Law, which aims to protect Israel's status as a national state
of the Jewish people, in order to consolidate the values of the State of Israel in the law of
nationalism as a Jewish and democratic state, and after it realized that the Palestinian
counterpart does not seem to be caving in. Israel was also quick to enact the law because
of continued concern about the high birth rate among Israeli Arabs. This step is also
viewed as future-proofing the state of Israel in case a two-state solution to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict is no longer viable and the alternative one-state solution becomes
viewed as the only option, which could threaten the Jewish majority in Israel.
Additionally, the law in Israel has a very symbolic significance, and for the Arab
minority in Israel it represents an evidence of the marginalization of their status
(Aljazeera, Israel passes controversial 'Jewish nation-state' law, 2018; Haaretz, 2018).

In either case, the Jewish National Law has severe ramifications on the
Palestinian refugees issue. On one hand, the current Israeli government has declared on
multiple occasions that the two-state solution is no longer obligatory. In fact, observers of
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict admit that over the past few years, Israel has been actively
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working on the ground to reduce the chances for success of the two-state solution. In this
case, the Israeli government is using the Jewish National Law as a safety net in case a
large-scale influx of Palestinian populations were to happen, most likely from the West
Bank, by establishing a pre-existing status quo where only Jewish citizens have the right
to self-determination and certain civic privileges. On the other hand, the Israeli
government could be future-proofing the State of Israel from any potential drastic shifts
in demographics in case Palestinian refugees were given repatriation or in case Israel
decided to formally annex parts of the West Bank and consequently having to absorb
some Palestinians into Israel.

Finally, experts opposing the passing of the law say the Jewish National Law has
several other disadvantages, and risks violations of human rights by giving exclusive
support and civic privileges to Jewish citizens only. Some of those risks are:

1. The Jewish National Law repeals all UN resolutions that affirmed the right
of return and compensation, including UN General Assembly Resolution
194 of 11 December 1948. It also repeals all the agreements, such as the
Oslo Accords.

2. National law helps to open the door to another displacement of
Palestinians who live inside Israel and make up about a quarter of Israel's
population and hold an Israeli citizenship.
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3. The Jewish National Law is a document of a legal nature that is binding in
the courts and the judiciary system if it conflicts with the provisions of
other Israeli law. For example, the Jewish National Law encourages
building Jewish settlements in Israel and the West Bank, which means that
there is no longer a need to circumvent the Palestinian land and sources
under the pretext of their development. Instead, Palestinian lands could be
confiscated publicly as long as they are used to build Jewish settlements.

4. National law will also help open the door to the implementation of the
settlement legitimization law, which is currently awaiting a resolution
from the Israeli Supreme Court. It will pave the way for rejecting any
proposal on the right of return while facilitating and encouraging Jewish
immigration.
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4. Effects of U.S. Policy on the Palestinian Refugee Issue
4.1. U.S. Support of Israel Policies
In 1887, the first Zionist lobby in the United States was founded with the aim of
establishing a Jewish state somewhere in the world. However, the United States did not
become increasingly interested in the Middle East until after World War II. At that stage,
the U.S. government has used all its resources to obtain international support for the idea
of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine and recognizing it as a member of the United
Nations in order to normalize relations with all neighboring Arab states. The United
States adopted a strategy of filling the vacuum resulting from the fall of Britain and
France. There were many factors that have drawn the attention of the United States to the
importance of this region and the importance of its extensive presence. These include the
search for proxies in the region to secure its oil interests, reduce Russian influence in the
region and ensure Israel's security. Furthermore, there are several more reasons that
continue to draw the formal U.S. support of Israel today on all fronts. Stephen Zunes,
professor of Politics and former coordinator of Middle Eastern Studies at the University
of San Francisco, discussed the topic extensively and illustrated that Israel’s military and
intelligence agencies have successfully prevented radical movements in the region from
expanding. He also adds that the Israeli military forces and agencies represent a proxy for
the U.S. in the Middle East, and therefore, it is in the best interest for the U.S. to support
Israel, even when Israel’s actions may be in violation with human rights. Zunes writes on
the topic of why the U.S. supports Israel:

“Through a mixture of guilt regarding Western anti-Semitism, personal
friendships with Jewish Americans who identify strongly with Israel, and fear of
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inadvertently encouraging anti-Semitism by criticizing Israel, there is enormous
reluctance to acknowledge the seriousness of Israeli violations of human rights
and international law.” (Zunes 2002, p. 1)

Zunes also adds that on top of the $3 billion a year that Israel receives in U.S. aid through
foreign military funding, there is also a theological foundation in the evangelical
Christian right that gives steam to the limitless support that Israel receives from the U.S.,

“[U.S. support of Israel is] Based in part on a messianic theology that sees the
ingathering of Jews to the Holy Land as a precursor for the second coming of
Christ, the battle between Israelis and Palestinians is, in their eyes, simply a
continuation of the battle between the Israelites and the Philistines, with God in
the role of a cosmic real estate agent who has deemed that the land belongs to
Israel alone secular notions regarding international law and the right of selfdetermination notwithstanding.” (Zunes, 2002, p. 1)
Additionally, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) representing an
alliance of Jewish Americans and friends of Israel in the United States emerged as a
major political influence on the decisions made by Congress and across the country, more
sharply under President Reagan who was viewed as the most pro-Israel U.S. president in
history (Thabet, 2016).

Despite the occasional tensions and problems experienced by U.S.-Israeli
relations, it has flourished and its success has become indispensable. The U.S. has not
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stopped providing financial, economic, diplomatic, and military aid since the
establishment of Israel in 1948 (Beauchamp, 2018). The U.S. policy supporting Israel has
not changed since President Eisenhower, including President Trump’s administration
today. Therefore, it is difficult to find serious differences among the ten American
presidents over the past 50 years on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict question, as Israel has
been the cornerstone of U.S. policy in the region. The neutrality of the United States
towards Israel, ignoring its practices and occupation of the Palestinians, is the general
nature of U.S. policy (Weir, 2014; Zunes, 2002).

4.1.1. The Trump Administration and Palestinian Refugee Issues
President Trump's administration is the first in history to support Israel
completely and without reservation, even on issues that previous U.S. presidents
remained neutral on for the past few decades to prevent being viewed as biased in favor
of Israel. For instance, one of the biggest controversial decisions made by President
Trump regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is the declaration of Jerusalem as the
capital of Israel and the transfer of the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.
Additionally, President Trump has publicly mentioned that he does not view the two-state
solution as the only viable solution to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Such
decisions and others taken by the Trump administration are welcomed by Israelis, but
viewed by Palestinians as further complicating the ongoing struggle.

Although the main focus of this work is to examine the Israeli governments’ stand
on the right of return for Palestinian refugees, it is critical to point out that the recent
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limitless support of President Trump’s administration would only cause a further
hardening of the Israeli government’s stance on the Palestinian refugees issue, and the
overall peace process. For instance, President Trump recently made a number of
decisions against the Palestinians that may directly cause harm to the Palestinian right of
return.

4.1.1.1.

Cutting Aid to the UNRWA

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near
East (UNRWA) was established by a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly
in 1949 to provide assistance and protection to some 5 million Palestinian refugees in
various areas including Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. On
January 16, 2018, Washington D.C. reduced its assistance to the UNRWA, freezing some
$300 million of its $365 million annual assistance to the agency. This move caused the
UNRWA to take several decisions that led to the reduction of critical services in the
Palestinian refugee camps. Additionally, months after the initial decision to reduce aid,
the U.S. administration decided on August 3, 2018 to cut all of its remaining financial aid
to UNRWA. Simply, President Trump’s administration has decided to stop any further
contributions to UNRWA. The Palestinians considered the decision a dangerous
escalation against the Palestinians aimed at adopting the Israeli government’s stand of
denying the right of return and eliminating the Palestinian refugee issue once and for all,
by defunding and dismantling the international agency that supports Palestine refugees.
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4.1.1.2.

Cutting Aid to the Palestinian Authority

On August 2, 2018, Palestinian Prime Minister Rami al-Hamdallah told a news
conference in the West Bank city of Ramallah that the U.S. administration had decided to
stop all aid to the Palestinian Authority. The White House issued a statement saying that
Washington had redirected more than $200 million annually allocated for economic aid
to the West Bank and Gaza to projects elsewhere in the world.

4.1.1.3. Closing the Palestinian Liberation Organization Office in
Washington
Saeb Erekat, a member of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO), announced on September 10, 2018 that the U.S. administration
officially informed them of its decision to close the PLO office in Washington "We have
been officially informed that the US administration will close our embassy in Washington
D.C. as punishment for continuing to work with the International Criminal Court against
Israeli war crimes and will take down the flag of Palestine in Washington, D.C.," Erekat
said in a statement published by the Palestinian news agency WAFA. (Aljazeera,
“Trump’s Seven Resolutions that Directly Impact the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, 2018)

Given the United States global position and its strong influence in parallel with its
ability to participate in the financing of any solution to the Palestinian refugees problem,
the two sides, Israeli and Palestinian, view the United States as the final judge that can
contribute positively to finding a solution for the millions of Palestinian refugees.
Although the U.S. government has not formally supported the Israeli government’s
position regarding denying the right of return for Palestinian refugees in the past, it has
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ignored Israel's actions towards the Palestinians. Israel has continued construction of
more settlements in the Palestinian territories, which slowly renders the right of return for
Palestinians impossible, since there will be no land to return to in a future Palestinian
State, in case an alternative solution is agreed upon by which Palestinian refugees return
to a Palestinian State instead of returning to Israel. Many scholars on the Palestinian side
of the aisle believe that Israel cannot do what it does to the Palestinians without the
political, financial and military support of the United States government. The United
States provides Israel with diplomatic cover in the international arena and at the United
Nations, and supplies Israel with most of its weapons and military equipment. The U.S.
has always described itself as the neutral party with regard to the Palestinian-Israeli issue,
but this description is not typically in line with its pro-Israel policy. However, President
Trump and his administration shifted drastically, in favor of Israel, from the previous
U.S. administrations’ neutral position on significant topics such as Jerusalem, the twostate solution, the right of return for refugees and the support of UNRWA. Such shifts in
the formal position of the U.S. would only cause the most right-wing government of
Israel’s history to be more rigid on negotiating any solutions for the Palestinian refugees
issue.
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5. Conclusions and Avenues for Future Work
It is important to point out that the right of refugees and displaced persons to return to
their homes is a fundamental human right, an inalienable right that does not diminish
over time. The right of return for refugees and displaced people was affirmed by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. Also, the right of return stems from the inviolability of private property,
which cannot be dismissed by occupation or new sovereignties. For example, the right of
return was applied to European Jews to recover their properties that were confiscated
during World War II, without the need to pass a specific international resolution.
Additionally, the right of return for Palestinian refugees has been confirmed dozens of
times by the International community since the 1948 war, beginning with the affirmation
by UN General Assembly Resolution 194 (Ba’ba, 2000).

However, despite all the agreements and treaties that affirm the right of return for
refugees, Israeli governments continue to reject this right for Palestinian refugees, which
is one of the most basic rights of any displaced people. Israel stands with all its might to
prevent the implementation of the resolution for reasons that sometimes are attributed to
public security and maintaining a dominant Jewish demographic in the State of Israel.
The U.S. is the only superpower that can effectively pressure Israel to implement all
resolutions related to Palestinian refugee affairs and the right of return. However, the
United States, through its unwavering support of Israel on all fronts, chooses not to
interfere with enforcing the right of return for Palestinian refugees.

40
The recent rise of right-wing governments both in Israel and the U.S. does not bode
well for the peace process between the Palestinians and Israelis, let alone the Palestinian
refugee issue. As mentioned before, President Trump's recent series of decisions
regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict disregard several international treaties and laws,
including the Oslo treaty, that provide for the right of Palestinian refugees to return to
their homes that were abandoned in 1948, including the Security Council and the UN
General Assembly Resolution 194, which guaranteed the right of Palestine refugees to
return to their homes.

The Palestinian and Jewish populations have gone through many challenges since the
beginning of the conflict in 1917. But practically speaking, the Palestinians have been the
weakest link in the political chain, so that the Palestinians continue to bear the burden of
the failure of the peace process. The peace process has been stalled since 2013, which has
worsened Palestinian-Israeli relations, the lack of a solution to the issues of Jerusalem,
refugees and settlement, and many other important issues.

In order to reach a solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, especially the refugee
issue, it is imperative that the peace process between the two sides must return.
Additionally, a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East would not prevail
without a solution to the right of return to the largest and oldest refugee issue in the
world. We must accept the reality, that there is an occupation and two peoples on the
same land.
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5.1. Two-State Solution
There are solutions on the international scene, and these solutions are realistic and
pragmatic, if given a chance to be implemented. One of the most viable options is the
two-state solution, which is widely accepted and supported by the international
community. Palestinians have been demanding for decades to be allowed to establish an
independent state of their own within the borders set in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli
war of 1967. The Israeli government’s stance on the two-state solution has fluctuated
back and fourth over the years in terms of support, or lack thereof. Most recently, the
right-wing government currently led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has publicly
declared that they do not support the two-state solution. Furthermore, the two-state
solution is practically fading due to the continuous building of Israeli settlements and the
cessation of the peace process between the Palestinians and the Israelis; this is on top of
the presence of an Israeli right-wing government that does not accept the potential
existence of an independent neighboring Palestinian State. In my opinion, the two-state
solution is the ideal, and most importantly feasible, solution for the Israeli and Palestinian
conflict. The two-state solution is the best option since the Palestinians and the Israelis
want independence; the Israelis want a Jewish state, and the Palestinians want a
Palestinian state (Franc24, “The Two-State Solution and Its Alternatives”, 2017;
Beauchamp, 2018)
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5.2. One-State Solution
Alternatively, the one-state solution is the only other fair and feasible option to the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This solution would basically entail the merging of Israel and
the Palestinian Territories into one big state (Beauchamp, 2018). The solution of onestate also means that the Palestinians and the Israelis would have equal rights. This result
is unacceptable to the majority of Israeli society, especially to the Zionists and
conservative right-wing, and also less supported by the Palestinians compared to having
their own independent state. However, given the circumstances for the Palestinian side
and their struggle for statehood since 1948, there is an increase in the percentage of
Palestinians who support a one-state solution, especially in view of the stalemate on a
two-state solution (Beauchamp, 2018; Halbfinger, 2018).

In my opinion, I do not think the one-state solution is a feasible one since there will
be an apartheid system that will discriminate between the two peoples on an ethnic and
religious basis. The double standards, laws, rights and privileges currently in effect will
lead to more frustration and anger. The government will be mostly concerned with rights
of the Jewish population. Additionally, the Palestinians would oppose such an
arrangement as they anticipate being marginalized and discriminated against. Therefore,
the one-state solution will not gain significant support in Israel or Palestine. Hence, the
two-state solution is the most feasible option in terms of implementation, and could lead
the Palestinians to be more prone to compromise on the refugees’ right of return to their
homes within the State of Israel, as long as they are offered the option of returning
instead to a Palestinian state with full sovereignty and internationally recognized borders.
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Hence, it is in fact in Israel and the Zionist movement’s best interest to support the
establishment of an independent Palestinian state, as that option may offer an ultimate
solution for the refugees and their right of return. However, Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu’s recent announcement that his government does not accept a full Palestinian
state neighboring Israel, but could instead offer something less than a state with no
security control, sends a signal that such rigid mindsets do not engender optimism for a
solution to the Palestinian refugee crisis in the near future.

5.3. Feasibility of the Right of Return for Palestinian Refugees
Realistically speaking, a big question remains to be answered if the Palestinian dream
of return were to become a reality, would Palestinian refugees return to Israel or
Palestine? In my opinion, the right of return for the Palestinians is a principle, and there is
a difference between the principle and its implementation. Most Palestinians want to have
the right of return not to necessarily make the decision to return to their homelands prior
to 1948 and 1967, but rather to be given the option to or be compensated in case they
chose not to return. One big factor that influences what Palestinian refugees would decide
if they were granted the option to act upon their right to return to their towns in historic
Palestine, or to even return to a Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, is their
current living situation in their respective locations. For instance, the Palestinian
Research and Studies Center in Nablus conducted a diverse sample of 1271 people of the
population of the refugee camps in Gaza and the West Bank. The study found that 25%
of those surveyed would prefer resettling elsewhere (i.e. leaving the refugee camps), 47%
would like to continue living in their camps with improved conditions of life, while 20%
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are willing to continue living in their current housing even without improving conditions.
What this shows is that, nearly half of the refugees surveyed were willing to remain in
their respective residences in Gaza Strip or the West Bank, under the condition of
improving their living situations. However, I believe that it is important to highlight that
the study was conducted in May 1995, a relatively peaceful period during which the
Palestinian Authority began building what was meant to be the foundation for a
Palestinian State. Certainly, if the same survey where to be done nowadays, after 23 years
of no significant improvement in refugees’ living situation but rather worsening, the
numbers of refugees willing to stay in their respective places of residence in Gaza Strip
or the West Bank would be much lower; those refugees are more likely to hold on to their
right of return and demand its implementation (Zureik, 1996, p. 6).
Palestinian researcher Basma Q. Darwish also conducted studies in the Palestinian
refugee camps in Lebanon and Jordan. She found that about half of the refugees would
want to apply the right of return. She also found that about one-third of the people in the
Jordanian sample said that, in any case, even if a sovereign Palestinian State is
established, they will prefer to remain in Jordan, because most of the refugees in Jordan
are naturalized and have jobs, some of whom are even considered wealthy (Zureik, 1996,
p. 8).
However, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon would mostly support returning to their
pre-1948 and pre-1967 villages, because their living conditions are the worst compared to
other Palestinian refugees elsewhere. As described by journalist Paula Schmitt, a
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Brazilian journalist, Middle East correspondent, and author of the non-fiction
book, Advertised to Death – Lebanese Poster-Boys,
“There are more than 70 professions denied to Palestinian refugees in Lebanon,
for example, and over 80 of them in Jordan. In neither country can they work
even as a taxi driver, for that would require a driver’s license and most of them
cannot legally possess one. In Lebanon, even the materials necessary for building
a refugee shack are regulated by law – bricks and a proper roof are too permanent,
and thus illegal.” (Schmitt, 2014)
Finally, I would like to weigh in as Palestinian refugee who was born and grew up
in Jabalia refugee camp, one of the largest Palestinian camps in Gaza Strip. My family
has received UNRWA benefits such as health, education and other services for decades.
Our situation was not as bad as the other refugees in Lebanon, for instance. However, we
always were taught to express our demand to return to our pre-1948 Brier village,
currently within the borders of Israel, because our situation was not as good in the camp
as my family had in the village. My family had estates and farms that they cultivated and
harvested, this was considered the source of their livelihood. My family members that
currently live in Gaza continue to express that they would return to what is now Israel if
given the chance. I used to be on the same page with them, but since moving to the U.S.,
I am not sure if I would go back to the unknown of returning to a village that my family
left 45 years before I was born. If my family’s living conditions in Jabalia refugee camp
were better, if my siblings and their children could receive proper education and
healthcare, I doubt they would be so inclined to go back to Brier village.
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Additionally, if I, or any Palestinian refugee, do in fact return to our historic villages
that existed 70 years ago, what would we be returning to? Places that do not exist
anymore? Homes that already have Israelis living in them for 3 generations? Simply put,
it is neither pragmatic nor practical to expect that the actual physical application of the
right to return is feasible. Rather, Palestinian refugees nowadays, in my opinion, are
looking for acknowledgment that they were forced to leave their homes out of fear for
their lives, and that in theory, they do have the right to return or be compensated;
although I believe the majority will opt for compensation knowing that repatriation is far
too complicated for implementation. In fact, the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey
Research (PSR) surveyed the views of refugee families living inside and outside the
refugee camps. Studies have been conducted on 4,506 refugees in Jordan, Lebanon and
the occupied territories where they wish to live if they have a choice. Only 10% of
Palestinians want to return to and live in a Jewish state. Of these, only 10% wanted Israeli
citizenship or Israeli passports, while 90% percent prefer Palestinian citizenship and a
Palestinian passport (Hanley, 2003).
To distill what in my opinion is a good start to end the issue of Palestinian refugees
once and for all, Israel should acknowledge its responsibility for displacing Palestinians
in 1948 and 1967, followed by agreement between Israelis and Palestinians on a
pragmatic form of an optional right of return to a Palestinian State that is given a true
chance at surviving via economic and security independence from Israeli Occupation.
This requires infrastructure and financial and economic potential for the future
Palestinian State to be able to absorb the large number of refugees that may choose to
return. Those that choose not to return to a Palestinian State should benefit from
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rehabilitation programs within their host countries, and should be offered citizenship and
equal rights wherever they are. However, pragmatic solutions are not always the most
popular as people tend to hold on to their inherited beliefs. Some on the Israeli side will
continue to deny any responsibility for the forced migration of Palestinians, and others on
the Palestinian side will continue to demand the application of the right of return and
leaving the option for each Palestinian refugee to decide whether they want to return or
not to their no-longer-existing homes and farms.
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